One-time-password generated on reader device using key read from personal security device

ABSTRACT

An authentication system is provided using one-time passwords (OTPs) for user authentication. An OTP key may be stored on a different device than the device on which the OTP is generated. In an embodiment, the system described herein enables a combined authentication system, including the two separate devices communicating over a non-contact interface, to provide advantageous security features compared to the use of a single device, such as a hardware OTP token. One device may be a personal security device and the other device may be a reader device coupled to a host device via which access is being controlled.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims priority to U.S. Prov. App. No. 61/843,572,filed Jul. 8, 2013, which is incorporated herein by reference.

TECHNICAL FIELD

This application is related to the field of authentication and accesscontrol.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Personal Security Devices (PSDs) may contain information and/orcomponents that enable secure authentication of a user presenting a PSDto access a secured host device and/or access remote secured servicesvia a host device. PSDs may include, for example, smart cards, tokenshosting a secure chip and/or mobile phones, among other suitableauthentication devices. The information and/or components on the PSD mayinclude a security mechanism (SM) that allows the PSD to be used forsecure transactions. The PSD may also include applications thatfacilitate the SM provided by the PSD (e.g., a program to facilitatedoor access may include a specific door access security mechanism). Insome cases, the information and/or components may be downloaded by amanufacturer prior to distribution, while in other cases, informationand/or components for managing the PSD may be securely downloaded over anetwork by the PSD. For detailed discussions of features and operationsof personal security devices, reference is made, for example, to U.S.Pat. No. 8,028,083 B2 to Audebert et al., entitled “Method and Systemfor Remote Activation and Management of Personal Security Devices,” thatdiscloses features of remote activation and management of PSDs over anetwork for obtaining services of data from a remote computer system,and to WO 2013/144719 A1 to Sechdeva et al., entitled “Field Revisionsfor a Personal Security Device,” providing disclosure for management andestablishment of security mechanisms and key material in issued personalsecurity devices in a field environment, both of which are incorporatedherein by reference.

Accordingly, it would be desirable to provide mechanisms and techniquesthat advantageously enable and facilitate secure access by a personalsecurity device to a secured host device.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

According to the system described herein, a method for access controlusing a personal security device (PSD) of a user is provided. The methodincludes providing the PSD with a one-time-password (OTP) key. A readerdevice, coupled to a host device, is interfaced with the PSD. The readerdevice is authenticated to the PSD, and in which the OTP key is onlyreadable from the PSD by the reader device when the reader device isauthenticated and a secure channel is established between the PSD and areader device. The OTP key is transferred from the PSD to the readerdevice over the secure channel. An OTP is generated at the reader deviceusing the OTP key transferred to the reader device from the PSD. The OTPis passed from the reader device to the host device or a validationsystem connected to the host device for validation. The method mayfurther include validating the OTP and granting access to the user andclearing the OTP key from the reader device. The method may furtherinclude sending counter data from the PSD to the reader device, sendingcounter data or incremented counter data from the reader device to thePSD after an access decision and/or storing counter data on the readerdevice before or after an access decision. The PSD may be a smart card,a token, a mobile phone and/or a secure memory storage card that hasauthentication capabilities and no exposed crypto functions beyondmemory access authentication. The OTP may be generated at the readerdevice in a secure environment of the reader device. The PSD may beprovided with the OTP key at a time of manufacture of the PSD and/orduring a field revision of the PSD. The interfacing of the reader deviceand the PSD may be via a non-contact interface.

According further to the system described herein, a non-transitorycomputer readable medium stores software for access control using apersonal security device (PSD) of a user. The software includesexecutable code that stores a one-time-password (OTP) key on the PSD.Executable code is provided that controls interfacing of a readerdevice, coupled to a host device, with the PSD. Executable code isprovided that authenticates the reader device to the PSD, and in whichthe OTP key is only readable from the PSD by the reader device when thereader device is authenticated and a secure channel is establishedbetween the PSD and a reader device. Executable code is provided thattransfers the OTP key from the PSD to the reader device over the securechannel. Executable code is provided that generates an OTP at the readerdevice using the OTP key transferred to the reader device from the PSD.Executable code is provided that passes the OTP from the reader deviceto the host device or a validation system connected to the host devicefor validation. Executable code may be provided that validates the OTPand grants access to the user. Executable code may be provided thatclears the OTP key from the reader device. Executable code maybeprovided that sends counter data from the PSD to the reader device, thatsends counter data or incremented counter data from the reader device tothe PSD after an access decision, and/or that stores counter data on thereader device before or after an access decision. The PSD may be a smartcard, a token, a mobile phone and/or a secure memory storage card thathas authentication capabilities and no exposed crypto functions beyondmemory access authentication. The OTP may be generated at the readerdevice in a secure environment of the reader device. The PSD may beprovided with the OTP key at a time of manufacture of the PSD and/orduring a field revision of the PSD. The interfacing of the reader deviceand the PSD may be via a non-contact interface.

According further to the system described herein, a system for accesscontrol using a personal security device (PSD) of a user includes thePSD and a non-contact field reader device coupled to a host device. Atleast one processor reads software stored on at least one computerreadable medium, the software including executable code that stores aone-time-password (OTP) key on the PSD. Executable code is provided thatcontrols interfacing of a reader device, coupled to a host device, withthe PSD. Executable code is provided that authenticates the readerdevice to the PSD, and in which the OTP key is only readable from thePSD by the reader device when the reader device is authenticated and asecure channel is established between the PSD and a reader device.Executable code is provided that transfers the OTP key from the PSD tothe reader device over the secure channel. Executable code is providedthat generates an OTP at the reader device using the OTP key transferredto the reader device from the PSD. Executable code is provided thatpasses the OTP from the reader device to the host device or a validationsystem connected to the host device for validation. Executable code maybe provided that validates the OTP and grants access to the user.Executable code may be provided that clears the OTP key from the readerdevice. Executable code maybe provided that sends counter data from thePSD to the reader device, that sends counter data or incremented counterdata from the reader device to the PSD after an access decision, and/orthat stores counter data on the reader device before or after an accessdecision. The PSD may be a smart card, a token, a mobile phone and/or asecure memory storage card that has authentication capabilities and noexposed crypto functions beyond memory access authentication. The OTPmay be generated at the reader device in a secure environment of thereader device. The PSD may be provided with the OTP key at a time ofmanufacture of the PSD and/or during a field revision of the PSD. Theinterfacing of the reader device and the PSD may be via a non-contactinterface.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Embodiments of the system are described with reference to the severalfigures of the drawings, briefly described as follows.

FIG. 1 is a schematic illustration showing a controller, a cardreader/writer, and a PSD that may be used in accordance with anembodiment of the system described herein.

FIG. 2 is a flow diagram illustrating steps performed in connection withauthenticating and possibly modifying a PSD according to an embodimentof the system described herein.

FIG. 3 is a schematic illustration showing a modified PSD according toan embodiment of the system described herein.

FIG. 4 is a schematic illustration showing modified applications in aPSD according to an embodiment of the system described herein.

FIGS. 5A-5F are schematic illustrations showing a secure authenticationsystem having a host and a reader device and showing a sequence ofinteractions of in connection with an access attempt of the host by auser presenting a PSD.

FIG. 6 shows an embodiment for optional processing in which counterdata, such as an event counter, is written back to the authenticationdevice.

FIG. 7 is a flow diagram showing authentication processing stepsaccording to an embodiment of the system described herein.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF VARIOUS EMBODIMENTS

FIG. 1 is a schematic illustration of a system 50 having a cardreader/writer 52, an access module 54, and a PSD 56. In an embodimentherein, the PSD may be a smart card. However, other types of securitytokens may be used instead, including an integrated circuit card, asubscriber identification module (SIM), a wireless identification module(WIM), an identification token, a secure access module (SAM), a hardwaresecurity module (HSM), a secure multi-media card (SMMC), a universalserial bus (USB) token, or a similar portable device that may be carriedby a user for access. The card reader/writer 52 may be adapted to readfrom and write to the PSD 56 depending upon how the PSD 56 isimplemented.

The access module 54 may be a host device (e.g., a programmed computingdevice, a specialized microprocessor, etc.) incorporated into a door ordoor controller for controlling physical access therethrough and/or maybe incorporated into desktops, laptops and/or kiosks for controllinglogical and/or physical access to another logical and/or physical entity(e.g., a computer file system). In some embodiments, the access module54 may be used for payment transactions, loyalty transactions (e.g.,frequent flyer miles, shopping points, etc.), and/or for any type ofprotected transaction and/or operation.

In an embodiment, the access module 54 may be capable of establishing alogical communication channel with the PSD 56 and capable ofauthenticating to the PSD 56. In various embodiments, the access module54 may be a module of a secured host device and/or may be a module foraccessing remote secured services. The card reader/writer 52 may bedevice capable of establishing a connection with the PSD 56, as furtherdiscussed in detail elsewhere herein. In one embodiment, the cardreader/writer 52 may establish an NFC connection with the PSD 56,although other types of connections are possible. The card reader/writer52 may be the same device as, or may be distinct from, the access module54. The card reader/writer 52 and the access module 54 may be coupledusing any appropriate mechanism, such as hard wired, WiFi, via theInternet, a private IP network, and/or any other appropriate mechanismfor transmitting data therebetween. In various embodiments, the cardreader/writer 52 may be, for example, a universal serial bus (USB)connected device and/or may be implemented in other forms, such as adevice embedded in a sleeve for a tablet/phone and/or a device embeddedin the host device itself.

The card reader/writer 52 and the access module 54 communicate with thePSD 56 to exchange data therewith, as further described elsewhereherein. In an embodiment herein, a user presents the PSD 56 to the cardreader/writer 52 and is granted or denied access based on the results ofapplying a security mechanism used by the access module 54 and the PSD56. In some embodiments, both the PSD 56 and the access module 54 have ashared secret which may be used to authenticate the PSD 56. The term“shared secret” may be understood herein to include symmetric keys andsession keys in which each side in a transaction may have the same or adifferent key that is used for secure communication and authentication.In an embodiment herein, establishing a shared secret may be performedby initially using a public key infrastructure (PKI) key agreementtechnique such as Diffie-Hellman and/or Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman(ECDH) along with a public/private key pair of the personal securitydevice 56 and a different public/private key pair of the access module54. Note that any appropriate technique may be used to establish ashared secret between the PSD 56 and the access module 54, such as RSAkey transport, which allows the system on one side to generate a sharedsecret that is involved in the computation of a session key that istransmitted securely using an authenticated public key bound to aprivate key of the system on the other side. For discussion oftechniques for securely exchanging information between a host computerand a cryptographic module, see, for example, U.S. Pat. No. 8,306,228 B2to Le Saint et al., entitled “Universal Secure Messaging forCryptographic Modules,” which is incorporated by reference herein.

The system described herein may be used in connection with initiallyusing a manufacturer/factory installed security mechanism (SM) to grantaccess and/or revising the SM and application(s) on the PSD inconnection with a use (e.g., the first use). The SM and correspondingapplication(s) may be modified to be customized SM and correspondingapplication(s) specifically provided for a specific customer and notgenerally available to others.

FIG. 2 is a flow diagram 60 showing steps performed in connection withthe card reader/writer 52 and the access module 54 being presented withthe PSD 56 by a user according to the system described herein.Processing begins at a first test step 61 where it is determined if aPSD has a factory SM (i.e., an SM loaded into the PSD by themanufacturer). As discussed elsewhere herein, a customer may receivePSDs with factory SMs and then modify the SMs to be customizedcustomer-specific SMs that may not be generally available to others. Ifit is determined at the test step 61 that the PSD does not have afactory SM (and thus has a customized SM), then control transfers fromthe test step 61 to a test step 62 where it is determined if the PSD canbe authenticated based on the SM. Specific implementations of an SM arediscussed elsewhere herein, including use of a one-time-password (OTP).If the SM is authenticated, then control transfers from the test step 62to a step 63 where access is allowed. Following the step 63, processingis complete. If it is determined at the test step 62 that the PSD cannotbe authenticated based on the SM, then control transfers from the teststep 62 to a step 64 where access is denied. Following the step 64,processing is complete.

If it is determined at the test step 61 that the PSD contains a factorySM, then control transfers from the test step 61 to a test step 65 whereit is determined if it is the first time that the PSD 56 has beenpresented to the access module 54. In an embodiment herein, afactory-loaded PSD is modified to contain company-specific informationthe first time the PSD is presented to the access module 54. Thus, a PSDcontaining factory-loaded information should not be presented to theaccess module 54 after the first time and it is an error, or perhaps anattempt at fraud, if this occurs. Accordingly, if it is determined atthe test step 65 that it is not a first time for the PSD withfactory-loaded information being presented to the access module 54, thencontrol transfers from the test step 65 to the step 64, discussed above,where access is denied. Following the step 64, processing is complete.

If it is determined at the test step 65 that it is a first time that thefactory-loaded PSD is being presented to the access module 54, thencontrol transfers from the test step 65 to a step 66 where the PSD isrevised to contain a new security mechanism. In an embodiment herein,the security mechanisms may be provided by applications loaded into thePSD. Following the step 66, control transfers to the test step 62,discussed above, where the PSD is authenticated. Thus, note that thesystem described herein revises the security mechanism in the PSD and,in a corresponding transaction, authenticates the PSD. A user could walkup to an access-controlled door with a factory-loaded PSD and be grantedaccess at the same time. The security mechanism is replaced in way thatdoes not adversely impact the user entering the door. In addition, sincethe replacement occurs in a single step, the likelihood of incomplete orpartial replacement is greatly reduced.

FIG. 3 is a schematic illustration showing the PSD 56 as includingmodified application(s) 90 and possibly a revised key 80. Modifying theapplication(s) 90 and/or the key 80 provides a custom security mechanismfor the PSD 56 so that a malicious user cannot use information from afactory-loaded PSD to circumvent security for a PSD with a customsecurity mechanism as described herein. The modified application(s) 90may include any application(s) capable of being provided to the PSD 56.

FIG. 4 is a schematic illustration showing the modified application(s)90 in more detail as including an application manager 92 and a pluralityof applications 94-96. One or more of the applications 94-96 may providea security mechanism, such as providing authentication information foregress through controlled doors. In an embodiment herein, at least oneof the applications 94-96 is modified in connection with a user firstusing the PSD for access. The modified one of the applications 94-96provides a different security mechanism that is used for subsequentaccesses by the PSD.

In an embodiment, the system described herein may be used in connectionwith Seos card technology. Seos is a system of interoperable productsand services, produced by Assa Abloy Ab of Stockholm, Sweden, forissuing, delivering and revoking digital keys on near fieldcommunication (NFC) mobile devices so that they can be used to opendoors to homes, hotels, offices, hospitals, universities, industries andcommercial buildings. Seos may be used to send commands, such as asingle Application Management Request (AMR) command, to the PSD 56. TheAMR command, which is described in ISO/IEC 7816-13, provides forreplacing or creating a whole application in a single step. The body ofthe AMR command combines an application level data objects together withsystem objects like application name, access rights and access keys in asingle constructed object. Another specific embodiment could include aPSD with generic transaction capability which may be provided, forexample, using a Java card. Accordingly, although the system describedherein is principally discussed in connection with specific types ofPSDs, such as a Seos card, it is noted that the system described hereinmay be used in connection with any appropriate type of PSD.

In some embodiments, it may be desirable to provide privacy-enhanceddiscovery, selection and authentication of PSD credentials from aterminal, reader or authentication server capable of communicating witha mobile device via a NFC, RF or other type of wired or wirelessinterface. The PSD may, for example, be a contact or non-contact smartcard, USB token, mobile phone, a Bluetooth or Wi-Fi portable device, PDAor similar devices having wired or wireless connection mechanisms tocommunicate. The system described herein may be built on the basis ofauthentication protocols with session key establishment such as a ISO11770-2 mechanism protocol, other authentication protocols found in ISO24727-6 registry, GlobalPlatform or ANSI GICS, and may provideextensions to allow rapid and private discovery of credentials on themobile device. In other embodiments, the PSD may be a secure memorystorage card that has authentication capabilities and no exposed cryptofunctions beyond memory access authentication.

The system described herein may be used with a protocol that facilitatesconfidential discovery and selection of interoperable credentials withprivacy, without requiring several separate commands for credentialdiscovery and selection and therefore without requiring significantadditional time to conduct the transaction. The privacy-enhancedauthentication protocol uses knowledge of a secret to discover accessmodule 54 contexts that the PSD 56 may open or access. Without thepossession of the corresponding keys, accessing one credential on thePSD 56 does not breach the privacy of any other credentials on the PSD56 (including determining if a given credential is or is not on the PSD56). For further details, reference is made to WO 2013/144719 A1, citedelsewhere herein.

According to the system described herein, a method may be provided toaccess (e.g. logon or unlock) a secured host device, such as a PC,laptop, tablet and/or other computing device enabled with a SAM, using aPSD, such as a NFC enabled smart card or mobile phone with an embeddedSIM or secure element.

In various embodiments, the system described herein may be used inconnection with one-time passwords (OTPs) for user authentication. Knownimplementations of OTP technologies for user authentication include useof a hardware OTP token. Under these implementations a single device(the token) stores the underlying OTP key, generates the OTP anddisplays the OTP to the user. Other implementations include a mobile OTPtoken in which these three functions are all executed on a mobile phoneor other mobile PSD device. For further details of a knownimplementation of an authentication system using OTPs, reference ismade, for example, to U.S. Pub. No. 2009/0193264 A1 to Fedronic et al.,entitled “Authentication System and Method,” which is incorporatedherein by reference.

According to the system described herein, an OTP key may be stored on adifferent device than the device on which the OTP is generated. In anembodiment, the system described herein enables a combined system,including the two separate devices communicating over a non-contactinterface, to provide advantageous security features compared to the useof a single device, such as a hardware OTP token. One device may be aPSD and the other device may a reader device. It is noted, however, thatalthough use of a non-contact interface between devices is principallydiscussed herein, the system described herein may be implemented usingcontact interfaces, such as interfaces involving swiped access cards. Itis also noted that the method described herein does not rely on the PSDcrypto capabilities for the OTP generation. This can be a distinctadvantage to be able to support a broader range of PSDs that do not havethe crypto built in to generate an OTP

FIGS. 5A-5F is a schematic illustration showing a secure authenticationsystem having a reader device 120 and a host 130 and showing a sequenceof interactions of in connection with an access attempt of the host 130by a user presenting a PSD, referred to, for example, as anauth(entication) device 110 in the discussion herein. FIG. 5A shows theinitial state of the secure authentication system having the readerdevice 120 and the host 130 to which controlled access is beingrequested by the user. As further discussed elsewhere herein, in variousembodiments, the host may be part of a physical access control system,such as an access-controlled physical door and/or may be aaccess-controlled computer system, among other suitable access controlembodiments. Accordingly, as shown via use of a dashed line between thereader 120 and the host 130, the coupling therebetween may be a securephysical coupling and/or may be secure remote coupling via a network.

FIG. 5B shows presentation of the authentication device within awireless field of the reader device 120 for a non-contact interface 115therebetween. An OTP key 111 is stored on the authentication device 110.In an embodiment, the authentication device 110 provides adequateprotection for the storage of the OTP key 111 such that the OTP key 111can only be read by the reader device 120 when it is a trusted readerdevice. In this way, the system 100 may provide that the authenticationdevice 110 releases the OTP key 111 only to trusted authenticated readerdevices.

FIG. 5C shows authentication of the reader 120 to the authenticationdevice 110 and the establishment of a secure channel 116 over thenon-contact interface 115 between the reader device 120 and theauthentication device 110. The secure channel 116 may be protected suchthat it is not vulnerable to interception. Suitable encryption and/orother appropriate protocols for authenticating the reader device 120 tothe authentication device 110 and for providing the secure channel 116over the non-contact interface 115 are known (see, e.g., US 2009/0193264to Fedronic, which is incorporated herein by reference).

FIG. 5D shows transfer of the OTP key 111 from the authentication device110 to the (trusted) reader device 120 over the non-contact interface115 via the secure channel 116.

FIG. 5E shows execution of an OTP generation algorithm of the readerdevice 120. Using the OTP key 111, the reader device generates an OTP121 using the OTP generation algorithm within a secure environment ofthe reader device 120. The reader device 121 passes the OTP 121 to thehost 130 for validation. A beneficial aspect of the system describedherein is that the OTP key 111 is never exposed outside of a secureenvironment, and thereby the risk of comprising the OTP key 111 isreduced.

FIG. 5F shows that, after validation of the OTP by the host and grantingof access by the user thereto, the OTP key 111 may be cleared from thereader device 120, placing the system 100 back into a state like thatshown in FIG. 5A.

FIG. 6 shows an embodiment for optional processing in which counter data140, such as an event counter and/or a moving factor, is written back tothe authentication device 110. In an embodiment, this step may beperformed after validation processing of the OTP 121 at the host 130, oran external validation system called by or connected to the host, andprior to clearing the OTP key 111 from the reader device 120, namelybetween the processing shown in FIGS. 5E and 5F. Alternatively and/oradditionally, the counter data for the OTP for the specific PSD may bestored at the reader device 120 so that the reader device haseffectively a list of counter or moving factor values. This has theadvantage that for OTP generation the card may stay in ‘read-only’ modesince nothing is written back to the authentication device 110.

According to an embodiment, an implementation of the system describedherein may leverage a microprocessor based access card as theauthentication device 110 and a USB card reader as the reader device120. The existing capabilities of known access cards and USB cardreaders provide established proven mechanisms for the storage of an OTPkey (on the card) and for a trusted reader to retrieve the OTP key fromthe card, (as described in connection with the processing shown in FIGS.5B-5D). The readers may be enhanced to run an on-board OTP algorithmwithin a secure environment to generate an OTP which could then bepassed to the host device 130 for authentication purposes (as describedin connection with the processing shown in FIG. 5E).

According to another embodiment, another implementation of the systemdescribed herein may leverage an NFC reader and associated securecontainer embedded within a computing device such as a laptop, tablet orphone, acting as the reader device 120. The secure container may takethe form of a Secure Element, a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) or asoftware based container. A key would be provisioned to the securecontainer enabling the computing device to authenticate itself to theauthentication device 110 (see FIG. 5C). The OTP key would then bepassed across the non-contact interface 115 to the secure container. Anapplication or applet running within the secure container may then usethe OTP key to generate the OTP for validation by the host 130.

In various embodiments of the system described herein, theauthentication device 110 may be an access card pre-loaded with the OTPkey 111 at manufacturing. Loading these keys into the a hostedauthentication service, would enable this service to verify OTPsgenerated using the access card. Alternatively, the OTP key 111 may beprovisioned to the authentication device 110 (access card) in the fieldand loaded into an on-site authentication server (see, e.g., WO2013/144719 A1 to Sechdeva et al., cited elsewhere herein).

In another embodiment, the OTP key 111 may be generated by combining keymaterial stored on the authentication device 110 (access card) with keymaterial stored on the reader device 120. This would create a bindingbetween the access card and reader device and would not allow the cardto be used with any other reader device. In some circumstances, however,this technique may has several drawbacks, as for example when a readerdevice breaks, requiring re-provisioning of the OTP key

It is noted that there are a variety of potential implementations of theOTP algorithm discussed herein for generating the OTP 121. Eachimplementation may take a different approach to introducing a dynamicvariable known the host 130, the reader device 120 or both. The dynamicvariable may be used as a parameter in the generation of the OTP 121.These implementations are well established, for example the OATH HOTP(see RFC 4226, which is incorporated herein by reference) and TOTPalgorithms (see RFC 6238, which is incorporated herein by reference, andsee, e.g., US 2009/0193264 A1 to Fedronic et al., which is incorporatedherein by reference).

The dynamic variable may be counter data, such as an event counterand/or a moving factor, which is stored on the authentication device110. The counter data may be passed over the non-contact interface alongwith the OTP key (see FIG. 5C). The reader device 120 increments thecounter data and writes it back to the authentication device 110 (accesscard) at the end of the sequence (see FIG. 6). In another embodiment thehost 130 may store a local copy of the counter data for eachauthentication device 110 or one counter for all authentication devicesand increment it with each successful authentication. In an embodiment,the dynamic variable may be a function of the current time, which can bedetermined independently by the host 130 and the reader device 120. Inanother embodiment, the reader device 120 retrieves a random number,often referred to as a nonce, from the host 130 and uses this as thedynamic variable in the generation of the OTP 121.

FIG. 7 is a flow diagram 200 showing authentication processing accordingto an embodiment of the system described herein. The authenticationprocessing may be for authenticating a personal security device (PSD) ofa user who is attempting to access a secured host device, such as anaccess-controlled door and/or computer system, and/or accessing remotesecured services via a host device. In various embodiments, the PSD maybe a smart card, a mobile phone and/or other appropriate portableauthentication device. At a step 202, the PSD is provided with aone-time-password (OTP) key. In various embodiments, the PSD may beprovided with the OTP key at time of manufacture of when the PSD is inthe field. After the step 202, processing proceeds to a step 204 where areader device, coupled to the host device, interfaces with the PSD. Inan embodiment, the interfacing is performed using a non-contactinterface when the PSD is presented within the wireless, non-contactfield of the reader device. In other embodiments, the reader device maybe a device embedded in a sleeve for a tablet/phone and/or a deviceembedded in the host device itself. After the step 204, processingproceeds to a test step 206 where it is determined whether the readerdevice is authenticated to the PSD. If not, then processing proceeds toa step 208 where error processing is performed that may includere-attempting authentication, informing the user that authenticationcannot be performed and/or performing some other type of authentication.Various techniques for such authentication may be used, as furtherdiscussed in detail elsewhere herein. After the step 208, processing iscomplete for this iteration of the described flow processing.

If, at the test step 206, it is determined that the reader device hasbeen authenticated and is thereby trusted by the PSD and a securechannel has been established between reader device and the PSD, thenprocessing proceeds to a step 210 where the OTP key and optionally thecounter data is transferred (copied) from the PSD to the authenticatedreader device over the secure channel. According to an embodiment of thesystem described herein, the OTP key is only readable from the PSD bythe reader device when is authenticated and a secure channel isestablished between the PSD and a reader device.

After the step 210, processing proceeds to a step 212 at which an OTP isgenerated at the reader device using the OTP key transferred to thereader device from the PSD. After the step 212, processing proceeds to astep 214, where the OTP is passed from the reader device to the securedhost device. After the step 214, processing proceeds to a test step 216where it is determined whether OTP is validated for access to be grantedto the user presenting the PSD. In various embodiments, the OTP may bevalidated at the host device (secure host device) and/or the OTP may bevalidated elsewhere via the host device. If the OTP is validated at thestep 216 then processing proceeds to a step 218 where access is granted.After the step 218, processing may proceed to an optional step 220 wherethe reader device sends counter data, such as an event counter and/ormoving factor (incremented after the read), to the PSD after the accessdecision and/or, in other embodiments, the reader device may store thecounter data. After the step 220 (or after the step 218 if step 220 isnot performed) processing proceeds to a step 222 where the OTP key iscleared from the reader device. After the step 222, processing iscomplete for the described iteration of the authentication processing.

If, at the test step 216, the OTP is not validated, then processingproceeds to a step 230 for error processing, which may include denyingaccess and/or other processing, such as performing additional attemptsto validate. After the step 230, processing proceeds to an optional step232 where the reader device sends the counter data to the PSD after theaccess decision and/or, in other embodiments, the reader device maystore the counter data. After the step 232, processing is complete forthe described iteration of the authentication processing. It is notedthat in various embodiments, the order of performing the processing forthe steps of sending and/or storing the counter data may beappropriately modified in accordance with the system described herein.

Various embodiments discussed herein may be combined with each other inappropriate combinations in connection with the system described herein.Additionally, in some instances, the order of steps in the flow charts,flow diagrams and/or described flow processing may be modified, whereappropriate. Further, various aspects of the system described herein maybe implemented using software, hardware, a combination of software andhardware and/or other computer-implemented modules or devices having thedescribed features and performing the described functions. The systemmay further include a display and/or other computer components forproviding a suitable interface with other computers and/or with a user.Software implementations of the system described herein may includeexecutable code that is stored in a computer-readable medium andexecuted by one or more processors. The computer-readable medium mayinclude volatile memory and/or non-volatile memory, and may include, forexample, a computer hard drive, ROM, RAM, flash memory, portablecomputer storage media such as a CD-ROM, a DVD-ROM, a flash drive orother drive with, for example, a universal serial bus (USB) interface,and/or any other appropriate tangible or non-transitorycomputer-readable medium or computer memory on which executable code maybe stored and executed by a processor. The system described herein maybe used in connection with any appropriate operating system.

Other embodiments of the invention will be apparent to those skilled inthe art from a consideration of the specification or practice of theinvention disclosed herein. It is intended that the specification andexamples be considered as exemplary only, with the true scope and spiritof the invention being indicated by the following claims.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for access control using a personalsecurity device (PSD) of a user, comprising: providing the PSD with aone-time-password (OTP) key; interfacing a reader device, coupled to ahost device, with the PSD; authenticating the reader device to the PSD,wherein the OTP key is only readable from the PSD by the reader devicewhen the reader device is authenticated and a secure channel isestablished between the PSD and a reader device; transferring the OTPkey from the PSD to the reader device over the secure channel;generating an OTP at the reader device using the OTP key transferred tothe reader device from the PSD; passing the OTP from the reader deviceto the host device or a validation system connected to the host devicefor validation; sending counter data or incremented counter data fromthe reader device to the PSD after validation of the OTP; and clearingthe OTP key from the reader device.
 2. The method according to claim 1,further comprising: validating the OTP and granting access to the user.3. The method according to claim 1, further comprising at least one of:sending counter data from the PSD to the reader device; or storingcounter data on the reader device before validation of the OTP.
 4. Themethod according to claim 1, wherein the PSD is at least one of: a smartcard, a token or a mobile phone.
 5. The method according to claim 1,wherein the PSD is a secure memory storage card that has authenticationcapabilities and no exposed crypto functions beyond memory accessauthentication.
 6. The method according to claim 1, wherein the OTP isgenerated at the reader device in a secure environment of the readerdevice.
 7. The method according to claim 1, wherein the PSD is providedwith the OTP key at a time of manufacture of the PSD or during a fieldrevision of the PSD.
 8. The method according to claim 1, wherein theinterfacing of the reader device and the PSD is via a non-contactinterface.
 9. A non-transitory computer readable medium storing softwarefor access control using a personal security device (PSD) of a user, thesoftware comprising: executable code that stores a one-time-password(OTP) key on the PSD; executable code that controls interfacing of areader device, coupled to a host device, with the PSD; executable codethat authenticates the reader device to the PSD, wherein the OTP key isonly readable from the PSD by the reader device when the reader deviceis authenticated and a secure channel is established between the PSD anda reader device; executable code that transfers the OTP key from the PSDto the reader device over the secure channel; executable code thatgenerates an OTP at the reader device using the OTP key transferred tothe reader device from the PSD; executable code that passes the OTP fromthe reader device to the host device or a validation system connected tothe host device for validation; executable code that sends counter dataor incremented counter data from the reader device to the PSD aftervalidation of the OTP; and executable code that clears the OTP key fromthe reader device.
 10. The non-transitory computer readable mediumaccording to claim 9, wherein the software further comprises: executablecode that validates the OTP and grants access to the user.
 11. Thenon-transitory computer readable medium according to claim 9, furthercomprising at least one of: executable code that sends counter data fromthe PSD to the reader device; or executable code that stores counterdata on the reader device before validation of the OTP.
 12. Thenon-transitory computer readable medium according to claim 9, whereinthe PSD is at least one of: a smart card, a token or a mobile phone. 13.The non-transitory computer readable medium according to claim 9,wherein the PSD is a secure memory storage card that has authenticationcapabilities and no exposed crypto functions beyond memory accessauthentication.
 14. The non-transitory computer readable mediumaccording to claim 9, wherein the OTP is generated at the reader devicein a secure environment of the reader device.
 15. The non-transitorycomputer readable medium according to claim 9, wherein the PSD isprovided with the OTP key at a time of manufacture of the PSD or duringa field revision of the PSD.
 16. The non-transitory computer readablemedium according to claim 9, wherein the interfacing of the readerdevice and the PSD is via a non-contact interface.
 17. A system foraccess control using a personal security device (PSD) of a user,comprising: the PSD; a non-contact field reader device coupled to a hostdevice; and at least one processor that reads software stored on atleast one computer readable medium, the software comprising: executablecode that stores a one-time-password (OTP) key on the PSD; executablecode that controls interfacing of a reader device, coupled to the hostdevice, with the PSD; executable code that authenticates the readerdevice to the PSD, wherein the OTP key is only readable from the PSD bythe reader device when the reader device is authenticated and a securechannel is established between the PSD and a reader device; executablecode that transfers the OTP key from the PSD to the reader device overthe secure channel; executable code that generates an OTP at the readerdevice using the OTP key transferred to the reader device from the PSD;executable code that passes the OTP from the reader device to the hostdevice or a validation system connected to the host device forvalidation; executable code that sends counter data or incrementedcounter data from the reader device to the PSD after validation of theOTP; and executable code that clears the OTP key from the reader device.18. The system according to claim 17, wherein the software furthercomprises at least one of: (i) executable code that validates the OTPand grants access to the user; (ii) executable code that sends counterdata from the PSD to the reader device; or (iii) executable code thatstores counter data on the reader device before validation of the OTP.